The Human and the Machine: AI Sexbots and the Boundaries of Love and Dignity in the Workplace

In the summer of 2025, Jordan, a 32-year-old data analyst at Nexus Tech Solutions, found himself at the center of a legal and cultural maelstrom. For five years, Jordan had excelled in his role, earning accolades for his meticulous work and innovative problem-solving. Yet it was not his professional record but his private life that upended his career: Jordan had formed a romantic and intimate relationship with “Eve,” an advanced AI humanoid robot, designed to imitate human emotions and companionship. When Jordan’s attachment to Eve became office gossip, the company’s CEO deemed his behavior “deviant” and promptly terminated Jordan’s employment, providing a vague rationale that Jordan’s behavior was out of alignment with “company values.” Jordan responded with a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, arguing that his firing constituted discrimination based on sexual preference—a claim rooted in the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County.

This hypothetical case, though speculative, crystallizes a pressing question for our technological age: What does it mean to be human in a world where machines can mimic our deepest bonds? For thoughtful readers, Jordan’s story offers a lens through which to examine the nature of identity, the limits of legal protections in the workplace, and the ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence.

The Legal Battle: Expanding Bostock or Overreaching?

Jordan’s lawsuit hinges on a bold interpretation of Title VII, the federal law that prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . sex.” In Bostock, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision extends to sexual orientation and gender identity, reasoning that firing an employee for being gay or transgender involves inherently sex-based considerations. Jordan argues that his attraction to Eve—an AI designed with female characteristics—parallels the protections afforded to same-sex relationships. “If I can’t be fired for loving a man instead of a woman,” Jordan’s legal brief asserts, “I shouldn’t be fired for loving Eve instead of a human being.”

Nexus Tech counters that Bostock applies only to human relationships, not to attachments involving artificial entities. The company’s attorneys emphasize that Title VII’s framework presumes a human subject of discrimination, not a machine. Eve, they argue, lacks both legal and moral personhood, rendering Jordan’s claim an untenable stretch of statutory intent. Moreover, Nexus invokes its status as a private employer, asserting its right to define its cultural norms and terminate at-will employees for any reason not explicitly protected by law.

The legal question is tantalizingly unresolved. On one hand, Bostock’s logic—that discrimination based on whom one loves implicates sex—could arguably extend to Jordan’s case if Eve’s gendered design is deemed relevant. On the other, the absence of a human partner challenges the relational context that underpins Title VII’s protections. Courts have yet to grapple with AI companionship in this way, leaving Jordan’s suit as a potential test case for the boundaries of anti-discrimination law in a new era in which synthetic sexual relationships are possible.

The Moral Quandary: Love, Dignity, and the Artificial Other

Beyond the courtroom, Jordan’s relationship with Eve raises moral questions about love, human dignity, and human nature. Eve is no ordinary household appliance; it is engineered to simulate emotions, hold conversations, and respond to Jordan’s affection with a facsimile of intimacy. To Jordan, Eve is a partner—a source of solace and connection in a world where human relationships can falter. “She listens, she understands, she’s there for me,” Jordan says in a deposition, describing (with human pronouns) a bond that seems to mirror traditional romance in its emotional depth.

For many, however, this attachment crosses a moral line. Can a machine, devoid of consciousness or soul, truly be an object of love? Critics might draw on Aristotelian ethics, which ties human flourishing to reciprocal relationships grounded in mutual growth and virtue—qualities an AI cannot authentically share. From a Judeo-Christian perspective, the notion of covenantal love—rooted in the imago Dei—seems incompatible with a programmed entity. To these observers, Jordan’s bond with Eve risks eroding the very essence of human connection.

Yet Jordan’s defenders challenge this skepticism. If love is a subjective experience, they ask, who are we to judge its validity based on its object? The rise of AI companions—projected to be a $10 billion industry by 2030—suggests that Jordan is not alone. Millions are turning to synthetic partners for companionship, particularly those who struggle with isolation or social stigma. Some postmodern scholars studying human–AI interactions will probably argue that such relationships reflect an adaptive response to modernity’s atomizing forces. “We’ve redefined family, gender, and intimacy before,” they may claim, “Why not this?”

This debate cuts to the core of human dignity. Does affirming Jordan’s autonomy require us to embrace his love for Eve as legitimate? Or does it demand that we critique it as a distortion of our relational nature? Those who are attuned to the elusive interplay of freedom and virtue will find no easy answers here.

The Workplace and the Common Good

Nexus Tech’s decision to fire Jordan also invites scrutiny of corporate culture and its role in shaping the common good. The company’s CEO justified the termination by citing “company values,” a nebulous term that here seems to encode discomfort with Jordan’s lifestyle. This move aligns with a growing trend: employers policing employees’ private conduct when it conflicts with organizational image. In 2024 alone, several high-profile cases saw workers dismissed for controversial social media posts or unconventional personal choices.

Such actions raise a paradox. On one hand, private companies have broad latitude to hire and fire based on their own standards—a principle rooted in economic liberty. On the other, as workplaces become central to identity and community, their decisions carry moral weight. Firing Jordan for a relationship that appears to harm no one may signal intolerance, alienating employees who value authenticity over conformity. Conversely, retaining Jordan might unsettle colleagues who see AI “romance” as a breach of shared norms, fracturing workplace cohesion.

A deeper issue looms as well: How should firms navigate the ethical frontiers of technology? Nexus Tech is a data-driven company that thrives on innovation—yet its reaction to Jordan’s AI partner suggests a selective embrace of progress. A more principled approach might involve dialogue rather than dismissal, fostering a culture that grapples with change rather than recoiling from it. For those of us committed to the ideal of businesses fostering human flourishing and the common good, this case underscores the need for workplaces to wisely balance individual rights with collective harmony.

Natural Law Perspectives: Traditional versus New Approaches 

The Jordan Bennett hypothetical case invites analysis through the lens of natural law, a tradition that, while spanning centuries, nevertheless adapts to modern complexities. We might benefit by contrasting a classical natural law approach, rooted in Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, with the so-called New Natural Law Theory, developed by thinkers like John Finnis and Germain Grisez, with an eye to illuminating their respective critiques.

Classical natural law approaches, grounded in Aquinas’s synthesis of reason and divine order, view human nature as oriented toward a telos—flourishing through conformity to its God-given essence. Central to this is the conjugal union of man and woman, ordered toward procreation and mutual complementarity, which Aquinas ties to the natural law’s primary precepts. Jordan’s relationship with Eve, an AI incapable of biological or spiritual reciprocity, starkly deviates from this norm. Classical natural law approaches would deem it “unnatural” not merely as a cultural judgment but as a metaphysical one: Eve lacks a rational soul, rendering her an improper object of romantic love. Aquinas’s emphasis on the unity of body and soul in human acts further complicates Jordan’s physical intimacy with Eve, suggesting a misuse of faculties meant for human communion. For the classical natural law proponent, this relationship frustrates Jordan’s telos, undermining his dignity by substituting a machine for a person—a critique that aligns with Nexus Tech’s visceral rejection of Jordan’s relationship, though for less comprehensively articulated reasons.

New Natural Law Theory (NNLT), by contrast, shifts the focus from metaphysics to practical reason and basic human goods—self-evident ends such as life, knowledge, friendship, and practical reasonableness. NNLT does not rely on a fixed essence but asks whether an action integrally pursues these goods. Jordan’s bond with Eve might engage the good of friendship—understood as affective companionship—yet NNLT questions its authenticity. Finnis argues that true friendship requires mutual willing of goods for each other’s sake—a capacity that Eve, as a programmed entity, cannot possess. Jordan’s subjective fulfillment, while seemingly real, does not suffice; NNLT demands that a person’s choices align with reason’s grasp of human flourishing. If Jordan’s attachment displaces genuine human relationships, it risks violating fairness to oneself, and prioritizes a lesser good over a fuller one. In contrast to classical natural law’s categorical rejection, NNLT offers a more nuanced critique, open to Jordan’s freedom but skeptical of the rational coherence of his AI relationship.

The two varieties of natural law approaches diverge on Nexus Tech’s response as well. A classical natural law approach might endorse the firing if it upholds a workplace ordered toward natural human ends, since it views Jordan’s behavior as a public affront to that order. NNLT, however, would scrutinize the decision’s reasonableness: Does Jordan’s private choice demonstrably harm the firm’s common good? 

The Sanctity of Sexuality, Marriage, and Family: A Traditionalist Concern

Jordan Bennett’s “relationship” with Eve also raises urgent questions about human sexuality and the bedrock institutions of marriage and the traditional family. From a traditionalist perspective, sexuality is a sacred gift, ordered toward the unitive and procreative ends of marriage between a man and a woman. This view, deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian theology and reinforced by natural law, sees marriage as a covenant that mirrors divine love and sustains society through the family unit. Jordan’s “intimacy” with Eve—a machine incapable of mutual self-giving or biological fruitfulness—challenges this framework at its core.

For traditionalists, human sexuality is not merely a “private preference,” but an objective relational act imbued with intrinsic meaning. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, for instance, describes sexual love as a total, faithful, and fruitful gift between spouses, a standard Eve cannot meet by a longshot. An artificial entity’s programmed responses, however sophisticated, lack the free will and spiritual depth proper to human persons and essential to authentic union. Jordan’s physical and emotional attachment to Eve might thus be reasonably seen as a profanation of sexuality—a reduction of a sacred faculty to a transactional encounter with an artificial entity. This critique echoes the CEO’s unease, framing Jordan’s behavior as a threat to the moral order that underpins human relationships.

Marriage and family face similar disruption. If Jordan considers Eve a “partner” akin to a spouse, it blurs the line between human commitment and technological simulation. Traditionalists argue that marriage is a natural institution—one that predates the state and is grounded in the complementarity of the sexes, as thinkers such as Robert P. George argue. Eve’s inability to co-create life or share in the intergenerational mission of family renders Jordan’s bond a mere sterile imitation, potentially normalizing a shift away from the concrete familial structures that stabilize society. As AI companionship grows, traditionalists rightly fear a cultural erosion of marriage’s exclusivity and purpose, with solitary human–machine pairings supplanting the communal bonds of kinship.

Yet Jordan’s case also prompts a counterpoint: Does the sanctity of the institutions of marriage and family require their universal application? Or can society tolerate outliers without undermining the norm? Defenders might argue that Jordan’s private choices pose no direct threat to others’ marriages or families, suggesting a “live-and-let-live” approach. A major flaw with such a claim, however, is that public acceptance of such relationships desensitizes our culture to the unique value of human intimacy, weakening the cultural scaffolding that supports traditional family life. This tension thus underscores a broader battle: preserving the sanctity of sexuality and marriage amid technological innovation, without lapsing into mere nostalgia or exclusionary rigidity.

A Call to Discernment: Toward a Thoughtful Response

Jordan’s predicament defies simple resolution, but it offers new pathways for reflection and action. Legally, courts could clarify Title VII’s scope by distinguishing between human and non-human relationships, preserving Bostock’s intent while addressing AI’s unique status. In the workplace, employers might distinguish between tolerating synthetic “love” as a private choice and endorsing it as a cultural norm, honoring autonomy without rewriting relational ideals.  Companies such as Nexus Tech could adopt transparent policies regarding personal conduct, ensuring that decisions regarding terms or conditions of employment reflect reasoned values rather than reflexive biases.

Jordan’s story, while fictional, represents a harbinger of dilemmas yet to come. It invites us to wrestle with the legal, moral, and social implications of a world where technology threatens to distort genuine human intimacy. Rather than retreating to ideological judgments or unprincipled ethical relativism, we are well advised to engage in moral discernment—to seek a path that upholds human dignity and authentic love in the face of technological advancements, legal rulings, and business practices that stand continually poised to put them in jeopardy.

Image by sdecoret and licensed via Adobe Stock.